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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










LEON STANTON,  
A/K/A Baby Boy 
A/K/A Leem, 
                                Appellant  
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-11-cr-00473-001 
District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr. 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 6, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: May 6, 2014) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge  
Leon Stanton was charged in a four-count indictment with committing two 
drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and two 
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firearm offenses, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c).  After the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied several pretrial 
motions, the matter proceeded to trial before a jury.  The jury found Stanton guilty 
as charged.  The District Court sentenced Stanton to a total of 420 months of  
imprisonment.  This timely appeal challenging his convictions followed.1 
 Stanton contends that the District Court erred in ruling on several of his 
pretrial motions.  First, he cites the denial of his motion to suppress as error, 
asserting that the probable cause affidavit for the search warrant failed to establish 
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the 
Birdsboro, Pennsylvania, residence he shared with his girlfriend Chezaree Hall, her 
two sons, and his daughter.  In his view, because there were no averments in the 
affidavit to suggest that drugs were being sold at his home in Birdsboro the warrant 
did not provide probable cause for the search.  
“[W]hen a district court, in reviewing a magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause, bases its probable cause ruling on facts contained in an affidavit, 
we exercise plenary review over the district court’s decision.”  United States v. 
Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 261 (3d Cir. 2005).  In conducting our plenary review, we are 
mindful that “both we and the district court exercise only a deferential review of 
                                                 
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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the initial probable cause determination made by the magistrate.”  United States v. 
Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
236 (1983) (emphasis added)).   
The probable cause affidavit explained that the investigation concerned 
several shootings between two rival groups involved in drug trafficking.  The 
affidavit detailed the various members of the groups, including Stanton, and the 
various firearms in their possession.  For that reason, it was not necessary for the 
affidavit in this case to show that drugs were being sold at Stanton’s home.  It was 
sufficient that the facts established a “fair probability” that Stanton, who was not 
permitted to possess a firearm because of his criminal history, had a firearm at his 
residence.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.  We conclude that showing was satisfied.     
 Stanton also argues that the warrant failed to describe with particularity the 
things to be seized.  A review of the warrant shows that his argument lacks merit.  
In addition, Stanton contends that the firearms and drugs seized as a result of the 
execution of the search warrant should have been suppressed because the affidavit 
failed to establish probable cause or to meet the particularity requirement.  Because 
we concluded that neither argument was persuasive, suppression was unnecessary.   
In an effort to set aside the warrant, Stanton requested that the District Court 
disclose the identity of the confidential informants in the probable cause affidavit.  
As authority for his request he cited Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), 
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which held that an informant’s privilege to withhold his identity is limited and that 
the “privilege must give way” when the identity of the informant “is relevant and 
helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a 
cause.”  Id. at 60-61.  The District Court denied Stanton’s request for disclosure.   
 We review a “decision not to order disclosure of an informant’s identity for 
abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1993).  In 
United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1981), we instructed that it is the 
defendant who bears the burden of showing a specific need for disclosure.  “[M]ere 
speculation as to the usefulness of the informant’s testimony to the defendant is 
insufficient to justify disclosure of his identity.”  United States v. Bazzano, 712 
F.2d 826, 839 (3d Cir. 1983) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Moreover, we have determined that when disclosure is sought “in the hope” that it 
“will lead to evidence that will help [a defendant] make a Franks showing[,]” the 
“Roviaro balance will tend to tip against disclosing the informant’s identity.”  
United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).  In addition, when the informant’s role relates to 
probable cause, disclosure is usually not required.   Bazzano, 712 F.2d at 839 
(citing McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)).  Because Stanton hoped that the 
identity of the confidential informants would provide a basis for a hearing under 
Franks and because the informants’ roles pertained to probable cause, we conclude 
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that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stanton’s motion. 
 Nor do we see an error by the District Court in denying the motion for a 
Franks hearing.  Stanton’s guess as to the identity of the confidential informants 
does not constitute the “substantial showing” required by Franks.  See 438 U.S. at 
155-56, 170-71 (holding that before a defendant may obtain an evidentiary hearing 
to challenge the veracity of an affiant’s sworn statement, the defendant must make 
a “substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowing and 
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in 
the warrant affidavit”).  
 Stanton also contends that the District Court erred by failing to order the 
government to turn over materials he was entitled to under the Jencks Act.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3500.  We need not address this issue as Stanton has failed to direct us to 
the applicable portion of the record or to provide any legal authority in support of 
his position other than a bald reference to the statute.  See United States v. 
Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that appellant waived 
his claim because, contrary to Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A), his brief contained 
neither citation to the record nor supporting legal authority); United States v. 
Irizarry, 341 F.3d 272, 305 (3d Cir. 2003).  Nonetheless, we note that Stanton was 
provided Jencks Act material during the trial in accordance with the statute.  18 
U.S.C. § 3500(b). 
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 According to Stanton, the District Court also erred in responding to the 
jury’s request to repeat the instruction regarding the “in furtherance” requirement 
for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense.  Because defense counsel did not object to the 
Court’s instruction, we review for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  Viewing the 
instruction as a whole, United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995), 
we conclude that the Court did not foreclose the jury from making its own factual 
determination regarding the element of possession.  
 Finally, Stanton contends that the District Court erred by denying his motion 
to produce the grand jury testimony of each witness who testified regarding the 
events alleged in the indictment.  There is no merit to this argument.  Stanton does 
not acknowledge that the District Court denied the motion “except to the extent 
that it involves government obligations under the Jencks Act or Brady [v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S 83, 87 (1963)].”  Thus, Stanton was not deprived of any 
material to which he was legally entitled.  It is true that Stanton set out a litany of 
ways in which the grand jury testimony would have been helpful to his defense.  
He fails, however, to explain how the Court’s ruling constituted reversible error in 
light of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which shields grand jury 
testimony.2  
                                                 
2 We also note that to the extent there were any irregularities in the grand jury 
proceeding, the petit jury’s verdict rendered those irregularities harmless.  United 
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986). 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.   
 
